# Quantum Computing in November 2026: The Cost of Breaking Your Keys Keeps Falling

Three new estimates and a peer-reviewed Google paper put the quantum machine that could break RSA and elliptic-curve keys at 19,397 to 500,000 qubits. The deadlines are set, most origin servers have not moved, and KXCO's free post-quantum library scores 9.8 on the OpenSSF Scorecard.

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Last modified: 2026-11-16

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By Shayne Heffernan · 2026-11-16
Tags: $IBM, $IONQ, $QNT, $GOOGL, $MSFT, $INTC, $PSQL, $AAPL, $NET, $FFIV, quantum computing, post-quantum cryptography, ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, OpenSSF Scorecard, npm, Shayne Heffernan
Signed: ML-DSA-87, anchored on Armature L1.
Nothing in this article is investment advice.

No quantum computer can break today's public keys yet. What changed in the last 90 days is the published estimate of the machine that could. Between August and October, IonQ, Iceberg Quantum and Alice & Bob published new estimates, and Google's March estimate passed peer review. Together they put a break of an RSA-2048 key or a 256-bit elliptic-curve key at between 19,397 and 500,000 physical qubits. IonQ said no machine able to run its attack exists ([PRX Quantum](https://journals.aps.org/prxquantum/abstract/10.1103/j3xf-bw18); [IonQ](https://ionq.com/blog/the-first-full-stack-blueprint-for-breaking-256-bit-elliptic-curve-signatures); [PostQuantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/iceberg-pinnacle-crevasse-rsa/); [IACR ePrint](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2665)). In May 2025, Google's Craig Gidney put RSA-2048 at under a million ([Gidney, arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917)). Two of the machines in service show how far apart the two sides still are: Quantinuum's Helios has 98 qubits and IBM's Nighthawk r2 has 120 ([Quantum Computing Report](https://quantumcomputingreport.com/quantinuum-demonstrates-helix-quantum-error-correction-architecture-on-helios-hardware/); [The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/11/11/ibm-nighthawk-r3-processor-520-programmable-qubits/)).

My view is plain. Any institution that encrypts or signs something that must stay private or binding past 2030 should start moving to post-quantum cryptography now, not on the day a machine is announced. KXCO has made that move across its products, and it publishes the cryptography free on npm ([kxco.ai/architecture](https://kxco.ai/architecture/)). The core library, kxco-post-quantum, scores 9.8 out of 10 on the OpenSSF Scorecard, against 6.3 for OpenSSL and 6.2 for Node.js ([OpenSSF Scorecard, kxco-post-quantum](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-post-quantum); [Scorecard, OpenSSL](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/openssl/openssl); [Scorecard, Node.js](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/nodejs/node)).

## What changed in the last 90 days

### The cost of a break kept falling

The estimates matter more than any single machine, because they set the size of machine that would put today's keys at risk.

- **Google, 21 August.** Google Quantum AI's estimate for secp256k1, the elliptic-curve keys Bitcoin uses, was published in PRX Quantum after peer review: at most 1,200 logical qubits, running in minutes on fewer than half a million physical qubits ([PRX Quantum](https://journals.aps.org/prxquantum/abstract/10.1103/j3xf-bw18)). The paper says the first fast machines would enable attacks on the transactions of some cryptocurrencies while they wait to be confirmed ([PRX Quantum](https://journals.aps.org/prxquantum/abstract/10.1103/j3xf-bw18)).
- **IonQ, 8 September.** IonQ estimated that 19,397 trapped-ion qubits could solve the same elliptic-curve problem in 25.7 days per attempt. IonQ said no such machine exists and the study is not a demonstration ([IonQ](https://ionq.com/blog/the-first-full-stack-blueprint-for-breaking-256-bit-elliptic-curve-signatures)).
- **Iceberg Quantum, 22 October.** Iceberg put RSA-2048 at 72,000 physical qubits and 3.7 days. It published the figures as a website post, without a paper ([PostQuantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/iceberg-pinnacle-crevasse-rsa/)).
- **Alice & Bob, 28 October.** A preprint put RSA-2048 at 22,593 cat qubits and 3.14 days, which Alice & Bob calls 40 times fewer physical qubits than Gidney's 2025 estimate ([IACR ePrint](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2665); [The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/29/alice-bob-22593-qubits-break-rsa-2048/)). PostQuantum.com notes that the headline assumes a qubit nobody has built, one that goes about 100 years without a bit-flip error, and that the company's largest error-correction chip has 12 cat qubits ([PostQuantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/alice-bob-rsa-2048-cat-qubits)). The best peer-reviewed measurement with quantum control is 22 seconds, and the company's own preliminary results reach 44 minutes on a single qubit and 189 to 252 minutes on three qubits, where it has not yet shown the same level of control ([PostQuantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/alice-bob-rsa-2048-cat-qubits)).

AI is now cutting the cost as well. On 16 October Anthropic reported that its model Claude Mythos 5, in a 53-hour run with minimal human input, designed an elliptic-curve point-addition circuit, one step of the attack, with 17 times fewer gates than the smallest previous design for 12% more qubits ([Anthropic](https://anthropic.com/research/designing-efficient-quantum-circuits)). The circuit is a component, not a whole attack ([The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/17/anthropics-claude-designs-leaner-quantum-circuits-reducing-resources-needed-for-key-calculations/)). A paper of 9 September reported that ECDSA.Fail, an open project of researchers and AI agents, had cut its benchmark for the same step by 86.1% ([ECDSA.Fail, arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09582)).

### The hardware got better at correcting itself

A quantum computer breaks keys only when it can correct its own errors at scale. That is where the hardware news of the quarter sat.

- **Quantinuum, 19 October.** Quantinuum (NASDAQ: QNT) reported 99.9995% logical fidelity on Helios, five errors per million operations, with each step up in code size cutting the remaining errors by a factor of 12 ([The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/19/quantinuum-reports-a-10x-reduction-in-logical-error-rate-on-helios/)). Robin Blume-Kohout of Sandia National Laboratories, who was not involved, said a scaled-up version could reach useful fault-tolerant computing at less than a million physical qubits ([The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/19/quantinuum-reports-a-10x-reduction-in-logical-error-rate-on-helios/)). The figure measures how well Helios stores information. A two-qubit logical operation showed about 7 errors in 100,000 ([eWeek](https://www.eweek.com/news/quantinuum-helios-99-9995-logical-fidelity/)).
- **Google, 15 October.** Google reported that its magic state cultivation, published in Science, cut errors about 40-fold on its Willow processor and produced T-states at a record 99.99% logical fidelity. Google says it still has to be shown at larger scale ([Google](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/quantum-computing/magic-state-cultivation-quantum-computing/)).
- **IBM, 11 November.** IBM (NYSE: IBM) said Nighthawk r2 runs more than 7,500 operations on 120 qubits, and that it plans to link two 520-qubit Nighthawk r3 processors into a 1,040-qubit system in 2027 ([The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/11/11/ibm-nighthawk-r3-processor-520-programmable-qubits/)). IBM also said the research community reached quantum advantage in 2026 ([IBM](https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/qdc-2026)).

The gap is still wide. A benchmark preprint of 10 September, not yet peer reviewed, concluded that computing capability must grow by five orders of magnitude to reach recognised useful problems ([QUOPS preprint, arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12146)). It scored Helios at 1,504 against about 250 million for factoring RSA-2048 ([Quantum Computing Report](https://quantumcomputingreport.com/sandia-quantinuum-and-nvidia-introduce-quops-framework-to-benchmark-physical-and-logical-quantum-performance/)).

### Governments and markets put money behind it

- **DARPA, 7 October.** Atom Computing, Diraq, IBM and IonQ moved into Stage C, the final stage of DARPA's Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, joining Microsoft and PsiQuantum ([DARPA](https://www.darpa.mil/news/2026/four-more-teams-enter-quantum-benchmarking-initiative-final-stage)). The initiative's managing director, Micah Stoutimore, said DARPA "increasingly" expects someone to build a utility-scale quantum computer by 2033 ([DARPA](https://www.darpa.mil/news/2026/four-more-teams-enter-quantum-benchmarking-initiative-final-stage)). Stage C performers can be awarded up to $300 million ([DARPA](https://www.darpa.mil/research/programs/quantum-benchmarking-initiative)).
- **The Department of Energy, 17 September.** DOE opened a competition with up to $215 million in planned funding for machines with at least 100 logical qubits ([DOE](https://www.energy.gov/science/articles/doe-launches-competition-accelerate-development-worlds-first-fault-tolerant)).
- **The money.** IonQ (NYSE: IONQ) priced a $2.0 billion equity offering at $40 a share on 14 October, and reported third-quarter revenue of $173.8 million, up 336%, of which $83.5 million came from its SkyWater foundry business ([The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/14/ionq-announces-pricing-2-billion-equity-offering/); [IonQ](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001824920/000119312526449779/ionq-ex99_1.htm)). Pasqal completed its listing deal on 28 August, with its shares to trade on Nasdaq as PSQL, and Intel (NASDAQ: INTC) agreed on 26 October to buy the quantum software company Classiq ([The Quantum Insider](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/08/28/pasqal-completes-spac-merger-with-360-million-in-cash/); [Intel](https://www.intc.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1784/intel-to-acquire-classiq-to-create-a-full-stack-quantum-computing-platform)).
- **China, 8 November.** China showed Qianzhen in Hefei, its first neutral-atom prototype designed to connect several processors ([China News Service](https://www.ecns.cn/cns-wire/2026-11-09/detail-ihfmuiku4871306.shtml)).

![Exhibit 1, chart: six published estimates of the qubits needed to break today's public keys, from under 1 million to 19,397, against machines in service of 98 and 120 qubits](https://livetradingnews-media.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/media/2026/11/16/cmpgg3-d529291705cfdba7.svg)

How to read Exhibit 1: each red sphere is a published estimate of the machine needed to break a key, each gold sphere is a machine in service, and the dashed ring is IonQ's plan for 2027. Every step on the scale is ten times the last, so the distance from 120 qubits to 19,397 is just over two steps. Gidney's and Google's figures are upper bounds. Alice & Bob counts cat qubits of a quality nobody has built yet ([PostQuantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/alice-bob-rsa-2048-cat-qubits)). The one estimate not described above, a March preprint by Madelyn Cain and co-authors, put a P-256 break at 26,000 neutral-atom qubits in a few days ([Cain et al., arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28627)).

## The next year, and the plans beyond it

These are plans, stated as the companies and governments state them.

- **Around the turn of the year**, Magne, the machine Atom Computing is building with Microsoft software for Denmark, was due to be ready for use, on the plan its funder published in July 2025 ([Novo Nordisk Foundation](https://novonordiskfonden.dk/en/news/new-quantum-computer-with-great-potential-to-boost-nordic-research-and-innovation/)).
- **In 2027**, Quantinuum plans to integrate its next system, Sol, in the first quarter, commission a Helios in Singapore in the spring and deliver Sol in the second half, tuned towards 100 logical qubits ([Quantinuum](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0002110105/000162828026071000/q32026earningspressrelease.htm)). IBM plans its 1,040-qubit linked system ([IBM](https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/qdc-2026)). IonQ's roadmap targets 10,000 physical qubits and 800 logical qubits ([IonQ](https://ionq.com/roadmap)).
- **In 2028 and 2029**, the first fault-tolerant or scalable machines are due: IBM's Starling and Quantinuum's Apollo in 2029, Microsoft's scalable machine by 2029, QuEra's Libra in 2028, and the Department of Energy's fault-tolerant capability by 2028 ([IBM](https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/path-to-ibm-quantum-starling); [Quantinuum](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0002110105/000162828026071000/q32026earningspressrelease.htm); [Microsoft](https://quantum.microsoft.com/en-us/insights/blogs/majorana-2-scalable-quantum-processor); [QuEra](https://www.quera.com/press-releases/quera-unveils-gigaquop-class-fault-tolerant-roadmap-and-invites-organizations-to-co-design-quantum-applications); [DOE](https://www.energy.gov/science/articles/energy-department-announces-initiative-create-and-deploy-worlds-first)).

Experts give the risk real weight within a decade. The Global Risk Institute's latest survey of 26 experts rates a machine that breaks RSA-2048 within 24 hours as 28% to 49% likely within 10 years, and 51% to 70% likely within 15 ([Global Risk Institute](https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/quantum-threat-timeline-report-2025b/)). Half of them put it at about 50% or higher within 10 years, the most optimistic reading the series has recorded ([GRI report](https://globalriskinstitute.org/mp-files/pdf-quantum-threat-timeline-report-2025.pdf/)). Google has set 2029 as the year it completes its own move to post-quantum cryptography ([Google](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/cryptography-migration-timeline/)).

## What it puts at risk

Three things are at risk. Data is exposed already, and signatures and ledgers become exposed the day such a machine works, while moving them takes years.

**Data recorded today.** Executive Order 14412 states the risk plainly: adversaries collecting United States information now and decrypting it later, once large quantum computers work ([Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/25/2026-12909/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks)). Europol's report of 7 October found that this "harvest now, decrypt later" threat is real, that it needs no quantum computer today, and that TLS, SSH and OpenPGP as used across the internet are exposed to it ([Europol](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Harvest-now-decrypt-later.pdf)). It rates the risk to large companies as medium to high, naming trade secrets, client lists, financial data and sensitive contracts, and the risk to government as high ([Europol](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Harvest-now-decrypt-later.pdf)). Europol found no clear evidence of systematic exploitation at scale, and said past thefts of encrypted data from high-value organisations suggest the material for later decryption may already be held ([Europol](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Harvest-now-decrypt-later.pdf)).

**Signatures.** Signatures are not exposed to harvesting, but NIST says moving them is also urgent, because that transition takes longer and needs more parties to coordinate ([NIST IR 8547](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf)). F5 Labs calls the risk "trust now, forge later": a quantum computer could forge a web certificate that browsers fully trust, firmware trusted by security chips, or ransomware signed with a trusted certificate ([F5 Labs](https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/2026-state-of-pqc-on-the-web)). Once an attacker derives one certificate authority's private key, the quantum computer is no longer needed, and ordinary hardware can mint millions of forged certificates ([F5 Labs](https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/2026-state-of-pqc-on-the-web)). Cloudflare warns that any automatic software-update mechanism then becomes a route for running an attacker's code ([Cloudflare](https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-roadmap/)). For payment cards, EMVCo's analysis is that breaking an issuer's public key would allow fake cards for offline payments ([Europol](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Post-quantum-cryptography-report.pdf)).

**Ledgers.** Europol's second report of 7 October finds that wallets, not the integrity of the chain, are the main exposure: Shor's algorithm derives a private key from a public key, and keys on a public ledger are visible to anyone in advance ([Europol](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Quantum-computing-cryptocurrencies.pdf)). It states that Bitcoin and Ethereum have yet to move to post-quantum cryptography ([Europol](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Quantum-computing-cryptocurrencies.pdf)). The size of the exposure depends on who counts:

- Project Eleven counted 6,909,255 BTC, about 33% of supply, in quantum-vulnerable addresses in February 2026 ([Project Eleven](https://report.projecteleven.com/section-2/elliptic-curve-digital-signatures)).
- CoinShares counted about 1.6 million BTC in legacy pay-to-public-key outputs, whose keys are visible, and about 10,200 BTC in outputs large enough to move the market if stolen ([CoinShares](https://etp.coinshares.com/insights/research-data/quantum-vulnerability-in-bitcoin-a-manageable-risk/)).
- BIP-360, a proposed Bitcoin upgrade, was still a draft on 16 November and protects only against long-exposure attacks ([BIP-360](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0360.mediawiki)).

## The deadlines are already set

The standards exist. NIST published FIPS 203, 204 and 205, the post-quantum standards for key establishment and signatures, on 13 August 2024 and called them ready for immediate use ([NIST](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards)). The dates to move off the old algorithms are now set.

- **NIST, 27 October 2026.** The final IR 8547 lists RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA signatures, and Diffie-Hellman and MQV key establishment, as deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035 ([NIST IR 8547](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf)). That window is for lower-risk systems, and it does not relax the earlier federal deadlines ([NIST IR 8547](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf)).
- **The White House, 22 June 2026.** Executive Order 14412 directs that agencies move all high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030, and to post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031 ([Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/25/2026-12909/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks)). It gives the FAR Council 180 days to propose a rule requiring covered federal contractors to comply by 31 December 2030 ([Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/25/2026-12909/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks)).
- **The United Kingdom.** The National Cyber Security Centre asks for discovery and a plan by 2028, the highest-priority migrations by 2031 and everything by 2035 ([NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines)).
- **The European Union.** Every Member State is to have an initial national roadmap by 31 December 2026, high-risk uses are to be moved by the end of 2030 and medium-risk uses by the end of 2035 ([EU roadmap](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/117507)).
- **Finance.** The Monetary Authority of Singapore proposed this month that financial institutions have a migration plan by the end of 2027, critical systems moved by the end of 2030 and the rest by the end of 2034 ([MAS](https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas-media-library/publications/consultations/trpd/2026/p019-2026-november-2026-consultation-paper-on-quantumsafe-migration-guidance-and-timelines-for-the-f.pdf)). The G7 Cyber Expert Group, in a non-binding statement, points the financial sector to 2035, with the most critical systems in 2030 to 2032 ([G7 Cyber Expert Group](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7-CEG-Quantum-Roadmap.pdf)).

NIST's own judgement is that, measured against the 10 to 20 years earlier cryptographic transitions took, the US federal deadlines of 2030 and 2031 leave little margin ([NIST IR 8547](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf)).

## 16 free packages and a 9.8 Scorecard

KXCO publishes sixteen post-quantum packages on npm, free under the Apache-2.0 licence. KXCO calls them "the cryptography that KXCO's products are built on", and they need no account and no API key ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)). The core library, kxco-post-quantum, provides ML-DSA-87, ML-DSA-65, ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-768 and SLH-DSA, the algorithms NIST standardised in FIPS 203, 204 and 205, and it makes no network call ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/); [NIST](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards)).

The OpenSSF Scorecard, from the Open Source Security Foundation, is an automated check of a project's security practices. It scores each practice from 0 to 10 and weights the total by risk ([OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard)). On its scan of 13 November 2026, kxco-post-quantum scored 9.8 ([Scorecard, kxco-post-quantum](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-post-quantum)). It scored the full 10 on code review, fuzzing, signed releases, known vulnerabilities, pinned dependencies, static analysis and dangerous workflows.

For comparison, on the same service, on scans between 9 and 16 November:

- OpenSSL scored 6.3 ([Scorecard, OpenSSL](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/openssl/openssl)).
- Node.js scored 6.2 ([Scorecard, Node.js](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/nodejs/node)).
- liboqs, the Open Quantum Safe project's post-quantum library, scored 9.1 ([Scorecard, liboqs](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs)).
- mlkem-native, an ML-KEM implementation from the PQ Code Package project, scored 9.0 ([Scorecard, mlkem-native](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/pq-code-package/mlkem-native)).

On scans of 9 November, four more KXCO packages scored 9.0 or higher: kxco-verify 9.3, kxco-pq-sdk 9.1, kxco-pq 9.1 and kxco-pq-chain 9.0 ([kxco-verify](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-verify); [kxco-pq-sdk](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-pq-sdk); [kxco-pq](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-pq); [kxco-pq-chain](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-pq-chain)). The core library also holds the OpenSSF Best Practices badge at the Passing level ([OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/15201)).

The evidence goes beyond the Scorecard:

- KXCO's post-quantum page reports 1,793 NIST ACVP test vectors, "all passed, zero failed", and 225 interoperability checks against liboqs, Bouncy Castle and the Python reference implementations, in both directions, with zero failures ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- The published packages rebuild byte for byte from their own source tags, checked on every run of KXCO's continuous integration ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- The core library's current release carries an SLSA provenance attestation on npm, which ties the package to the source and the build that produced it ([npm registry](https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/kxco-post-quantum@1.13.0)).
- npm counted 13,466 downloads of the sixteen packages between 17 October and 15 November 2026, 2,172 of them for the core library ([npm](https://api.npmjs.org/downloads/point/last-month/kxco-post-quantum,kxco-pq,kxco-pq-hsm,kxco-pq-audit,kxco-pq-attest,kxco-pq-chain,kxco-pq-vault,kxco-post-quantum-webhook,kxco-pq-cli,kxco-pq-network,kxco-pq-tls,kxco-pq-sdk,kxco-verify,kxco-pq-agent,kxco-pq-scan,eslint-plugin-kxco-pq)).

The packages a team is most likely to start with:

- [kxco-pq](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq) installs the whole family in one step ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- [kxco-post-quantum](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-post-quantum) is the core library ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- [kxco-pq-scan](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq-scan) finds the quantum-vulnerable cryptography in a JavaScript dependency tree, separates what Shor's algorithm breaks from what it does not, and writes a cryptography bill of materials ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- [kxco-pq-hsm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq-hsm) keeps keys in a hardware security module; on a token that supports ML-DSA the keys are made on the token and cannot be extracted ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- [kxco-pq-vault](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq-vault) and [kxco-pq-tls](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq-tls) encrypt files and channels with ML-KEM-1024 by default, the TLS package alongside X25519 ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- [kxco-pq-sdk](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq-sdk) issues ML-DSA-87 and ML-DSA-65 credentials for institutions, and [kxco-pq-agent](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-pq-agent) issues signing keys for AI agents, linked to the institution that sponsors them ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- [kxco-verify](https://www.npmjs.com/package/kxco-verify) is a standalone verifier that runs in a browser and shares no code with the signer ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)). KXCO publishes its signing keys at a fixed address, so anyone can verify a KXCO signature without an account ([KXCO key directory](https://kxco.ai/.well-known/pq-keys.json)).

## How KXCO uses it across its products

KXCO's architecture page says "Everything KXCO ships stands on the same cryptography", and its products page says every product runs on the same core, one that keeps a record of actions another party can check ([kxco.ai/architecture](https://kxco.ai/architecture/); [kxco.ai/products](https://kxco.ai/products/)).

- **Armature** (live) is KXCO's layer-one network and public record. It checks ML-DSA-87 and ML-DSA-65 signatures on chain and attests each finalised block with ML-DSA-87, so a party outside KXCO can check that an anchored record existed in that form no later than the time it was anchored ([kxco.ai/armature](https://kxco.ai/armature/)).
- **Herald** (live for domains, documents, people and agents) issues signed, revocable attestations for domains and documents, and identity credentials for people and AI agents, each checkable at verify.kxco.ai without an account. KXCO anchors the credentials on Armature ([kxco.ai/herald](https://kxco.ai/herald/)).
- **Portcullis** (live in parts) finds quantum-vulnerable cryptography across an estate, and its attestations are anchored on Armature. Its free entry point is kxco-pq-scan ([kxco.ai/portcullis](https://kxco.ai/portcullis/)).
- **Sovereign** (live) is software for holding and moving value. It settles on Armature, and licensed institutions hold the customer assets: KXCO supplies the software ([kxco.ai/sovereign](https://kxco.ai/sovereign/)).
- **Round Table** (live, private deployments) sits at the centre and reads findings from Portcullis and attestations from Herald as sourced claims ([kxco.ai/products](https://kxco.ai/products/); [kxco.ai/round-table](https://kxco.ai/round-table/)).
- **Guildhall** (live), where Members run their deals, can connect to Sovereign or to a Member's own custodian ([kxco.ai/products](https://kxco.ai/products/)).
- **Hanse** (in development, no launch date set) is designed to run on Sovereign, with Herald identities and Armature for the record ([kxco.ai/hanse](https://kxco.ai/hanse/)).
- **Live Trading News**, the page you are reading, marks each new article as quantum-signed with ML-DSA-87. Any reader can verify the signature offline with KXCO's pinned key and kxco-post-quantum ([Live Trading News](https://www.livetradingnews.com/the-week-ahead-on-wall-street-16-november-2026-look-for-the-bounce)).

![Exhibit 2, knowledge graph: KXCO's core library implements ML-DSA-87 and ML-KEM-1024; Armature and Live Trading News sign with ML-DSA-87; Herald, Portcullis and Sovereign anchor on Armature](https://livetradingnews-media.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/media/2026/11/16/cmpgg3-a77ceccb524cbd43.svg)

How to read Exhibit 2: gold lines run to the NIST parameter sets that the code implements or a product signs with. Dark lines run from a product to the public record it anchors on. Grey lines show a package that is part of a product, a product read into Round Table, and the library that checks this page's signature. Every link is stated on kxco.ai or shown on a live page ([kxco.ai/products](https://kxco.ai/products/)).

## Why other companies should do the same

The browsers have moved. Chrome, Edge, Firefox on the desktop, Safari 26, OpenSSL 3.5, Node.js 24.5 and Java 27 now use post-quantum key agreement by default ([Cloudflare](https://developers.cloudflare.com/ssl/post-quantum-cryptography/pqc-support/)). Apple's iOS 26 and macOS Tahoe 26 advertise hybrid post-quantum key exchange on TLS 1.3 connections automatically ([Apple](https://support.apple.com/en-gb/122756)).

The companies whose servers those browsers reach mostly have not:

- Cloudflare reported on 29 September that about 70% of browser traffic reaching its network uses hybrid ML-KEM, but only about 15% of the origin servers behind it do ([Cloudflare](https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-visibility/)).
- F5 Labs found that 54% of the top million websites support post-quantum key exchange, but only 22% once Cloudflare-hosted sites are removed. Government sites stand at 35.4% ([F5 Labs](https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/2026-state-of-pqc-on-the-web)).
- F5 Labs found post-quantum certificates, the signature half of the move, "non-existent" on the public web ([F5 Labs](https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/2026-state-of-pqc-on-the-web)).
- DigiCert's survey of 1,001 decision makers found 87% planning, testing or implementing post-quantum cryptography, but only 7% deployed across most of their certificates ([DigiCert](https://www.digicert.com/news/quantum-security-deployment-remains-stuck)).
- Axiad found that 46% of organisations have no single person responsible for the migration ([Help Net Security](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/21/axiad-pqc-migration-readiness-gaps-report/)).
- The Hong Kong Monetary Authority's first preparedness index for banks scored 2.3 out of 10, and 32% of the banks surveyed had not begun ([HKMA](https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2026/07/20260727-3/)).

In my view that is the gap that matters. A browser vendor can switch on post-quantum key exchange for all of its users. Nobody can switch on a company's signatures, identities, keys and records for it: the company that owns them has to move them. Google, which builds one of those browsers, has set 2029 for its own migration and puts authentication and signatures first ([Google](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/cryptography-migration-timeline/)).

KXCO has done that work on its own products. Armature attests every finalised block with ML-DSA-87, this publication signs every new article with it, and Herald, Portcullis and Sovereign anchor their records on Armature ([kxco.ai/armature](https://kxco.ai/armature/); [Live Trading News](https://www.livetradingnews.com/the-week-ahead-on-wall-street-16-november-2026-look-for-the-bounce); [kxco.ai/herald](https://kxco.ai/herald/); [kxco.ai/portcullis](https://kxco.ai/portcullis/); [kxco.ai/sovereign](https://kxco.ai/sovereign/)). The packages are public on npm for anyone to read. In my view, many other companies should be doing the same, and the first steps cost nothing:

- **Scan.** Run npx kxco-pq-scan in a project folder. It checks the JavaScript dependencies locally, without an account ([kxco.ai/portcullis](https://kxco.ai/portcullis/)).
- **Install.** Run npm install kxco-pq for the whole family ([kxco.ai/post-quantum](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)).
- **Check.** Run npm audit signatures, which verifies the registry signatures and provenance attestations of what you installed ([npm Docs](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-audit)).

## Talk to KXCO

KXCO builds this for institutions and government: an inventory of the quantum-vulnerable cryptography across your estate with Portcullis, post-quantum identities and signatures with Herald, and a public record a stranger can check on Armature ([kxco.ai/portcullis](https://kxco.ai/portcullis/); [kxco.ai/herald](https://kxco.ai/herald/); [kxco.ai/armature](https://kxco.ai/armature/)). If you hold keys, sign records or move value, write to KXCO at admin@kxco.ai or use the form at [kxco.ai/contact](https://kxco.ai/contact/) before 31 December, the date the EU has set for its Member States' national roadmaps ([EU roadmap](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/117507)).

## What to watch

Three dates in the next seven weeks. Comments on Singapore's proposed deadlines close on 23 November ([MAS](https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas-media-library/publications/consultations/trpd/2026/p019-2026-november-2026-consultation-paper-on-quantumsafe-migration-guidance-and-timelines-for-the-f.pdf)). The FAR Council's 180 days to propose the federal contractor rule run out on 19 December ([Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/25/2026-12909/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks)). Every EU Member State's national roadmap is due by 31 December ([EU roadmap](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/117507)).

## Sources

- PRX Quantum: [journals.aps.org](https://journals.aps.org/prxquantum/abstract/10.1103/j3xf-bw18)
- IonQ: [ionq.com](https://ionq.com/blog/the-first-full-stack-blueprint-for-breaking-256-bit-elliptic-curve-signatures)
- PostQuantum.com: [postquantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/iceberg-pinnacle-crevasse-rsa/)
- IACR ePrint: [eprint.iacr.org](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2665)
- Gidney, arXiv: [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917)
- Quantum Computing Report: [quantumcomputingreport.com](https://quantumcomputingreport.com/quantinuum-demonstrates-helix-quantum-error-correction-architecture-on-helios-hardware/)
- The Quantum Insider: [thequantuminsider.com](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/11/11/ibm-nighthawk-r3-processor-520-programmable-qubits/)
- kxco.ai/architecture: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/architecture/)
- OpenSSF Scorecard, kxco-post-quantum: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-post-quantum)
- Scorecard, OpenSSL: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/openssl/openssl)
- Scorecard, Node.js: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/nodejs/node)
- The Quantum Insider: [thequantuminsider.com](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/29/alice-bob-22593-qubits-break-rsa-2048/)
- PostQuantum.com: [postquantum.com](https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/alice-bob-rsa-2048-cat-qubits)
- Anthropic: [anthropic.com](https://anthropic.com/research/designing-efficient-quantum-circuits)
- The Quantum Insider: [thequantuminsider.com](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/17/anthropics-claude-designs-leaner-quantum-circuits-reducing-resources-needed-for-key-calculations/)
- ECDSA.Fail, arXiv: [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.09582)
- The Quantum Insider: [thequantuminsider.com](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/19/quantinuum-reports-a-10x-reduction-in-logical-error-rate-on-helios/)
- eWeek: [www.eweek.com](https://www.eweek.com/news/quantinuum-helios-99-9995-logical-fidelity/)
- Google: [blog.google](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/quantum-computing/magic-state-cultivation-quantum-computing/)
- IBM: [www.ibm.com](https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/qdc-2026)
- QUOPS preprint, arXiv: [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12146)
- Quantum Computing Report: [quantumcomputingreport.com](https://quantumcomputingreport.com/sandia-quantinuum-and-nvidia-introduce-quops-framework-to-benchmark-physical-and-logical-quantum-performance/)
- DARPA: [www.darpa.mil](https://www.darpa.mil/news/2026/four-more-teams-enter-quantum-benchmarking-initiative-final-stage)
- DARPA: [www.darpa.mil](https://www.darpa.mil/research/programs/quantum-benchmarking-initiative)
- DOE: [www.energy.gov](https://www.energy.gov/science/articles/doe-launches-competition-accelerate-development-worlds-first-fault-tolerant)
- The Quantum Insider: [thequantuminsider.com](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/10/14/ionq-announces-pricing-2-billion-equity-offering/)
- IonQ: [www.sec.gov](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001824920/000119312526449779/ionq-ex99_1.htm)
- The Quantum Insider: [thequantuminsider.com](https://thequantuminsider.com/2026/08/28/pasqal-completes-spac-merger-with-360-million-in-cash/)
- Intel: [www.intc.com](https://www.intc.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1784/intel-to-acquire-classiq-to-create-a-full-stack-quantum-computing-platform)
- China News Service: [www.ecns.cn](https://www.ecns.cn/cns-wire/2026-11-09/detail-ihfmuiku4871306.shtml)
- Cain et al., arXiv: [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.28627)
- Novo Nordisk Foundation: [novonordiskfonden.dk](https://novonordiskfonden.dk/en/news/new-quantum-computer-with-great-potential-to-boost-nordic-research-and-innovation/)
- Quantinuum: [www.sec.gov](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0002110105/000162828026071000/q32026earningspressrelease.htm)
- IonQ: [ionq.com](https://ionq.com/roadmap)
- IBM: [www.ibm.com](https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/path-to-ibm-quantum-starling)
- Microsoft: [quantum.microsoft.com](https://quantum.microsoft.com/en-us/insights/blogs/majorana-2-scalable-quantum-processor)
- QuEra: [www.quera.com](https://www.quera.com/press-releases/quera-unveils-gigaquop-class-fault-tolerant-roadmap-and-invites-organizations-to-co-design-quantum-applications)
- DOE: [www.energy.gov](https://www.energy.gov/science/articles/energy-department-announces-initiative-create-and-deploy-worlds-first)
- Global Risk Institute: [globalriskinstitute.org](https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/quantum-threat-timeline-report-2025b/)
- GRI report: [globalriskinstitute.org](https://globalriskinstitute.org/mp-files/pdf-quantum-threat-timeline-report-2025.pdf/)
- Google: [blog.google](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/cryptography-migration-timeline/)
- Federal Register: [www.federalregister.gov](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/25/2026-12909/securing-the-nation-against-advanced-cryptographic-attacks)
- Europol: [www.europol.europa.eu](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Harvest-now-decrypt-later.pdf)
- NIST IR 8547: [nvlpubs.nist.gov](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf)
- F5 Labs: [www.f5.com](https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/2026-state-of-pqc-on-the-web)
- Cloudflare: [blog.cloudflare.com](https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-roadmap/)
- Europol: [www.europol.europa.eu](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Post-quantum-cryptography-report.pdf)
- Europol: [www.europol.europa.eu](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Quantum-computing-cryptocurrencies.pdf)
- Project Eleven: [report.projecteleven.com](https://report.projecteleven.com/section-2/elliptic-curve-digital-signatures)
- CoinShares: [etp.coinshares.com](https://etp.coinshares.com/insights/research-data/quantum-vulnerability-in-bitcoin-a-manageable-risk/)
- BIP-360: [github.com](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0360.mediawiki)
- NIST: [www.nist.gov](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards)
- NCSC: [www.ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines)
- EU roadmap: [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/117507)
- MAS: [www.mas.gov.sg](https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/mas-media-library/publications/consultations/trpd/2026/p019-2026-november-2026-consultation-paper-on-quantumsafe-migration-guidance-and-timelines-for-the-f.pdf)
- G7 Cyber Expert Group: [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/G7-CEG-Quantum-Roadmap.pdf)
- kxco.ai/post-quantum: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/post-quantum/)
- OpenSSF: [github.com](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard)
- Scorecard, liboqs: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs)
- Scorecard, mlkem-native: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/pq-code-package/mlkem-native)
- kxco-verify: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-verify)
- kxco-pq-sdk: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-pq-sdk)
- kxco-pq: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-pq)
- kxco-pq-chain: [api.securityscorecards.dev](https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/KnightsbridgeAIQ/kxco-pq-chain)
- OpenSSF Best Practices: [www.bestpractices.dev](https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects/15201)
- npm registry: [registry.npmjs.org](https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/kxco-post-quantum@1.13.0)
- npm: [api.npmjs.org](https://api.npmjs.org/downloads/point/last-month/kxco-post-quantum,kxco-pq,kxco-pq-hsm,kxco-pq-audit,kxco-pq-attest,kxco-pq-chain,kxco-pq-vault,kxco-post-quantum-webhook,kxco-pq-cli,kxco-pq-network,kxco-pq-tls,kxco-pq-sdk,kxco-verify,kxco-pq-agent,kxco-pq-scan,eslint-plugin-kxco-pq)
- KXCO key directory: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/.well-known/pq-keys.json)
- kxco.ai/products: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/products/)
- kxco.ai/armature: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/armature/)
- kxco.ai/herald: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/herald/)
- kxco.ai/portcullis: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/portcullis/)
- kxco.ai/sovereign: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/sovereign/)
- kxco.ai/round-table: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/round-table/)
- kxco.ai/hanse: [kxco.ai](https://kxco.ai/hanse/)
- Live Trading News: [www.livetradingnews.com](https://www.livetradingnews.com/the-week-ahead-on-wall-street-16-november-2026-look-for-the-bounce)
- Cloudflare: [developers.cloudflare.com](https://developers.cloudflare.com/ssl/post-quantum-cryptography/pqc-support/)
- Apple: [support.apple.com](https://support.apple.com/en-gb/122756)
- Cloudflare: [blog.cloudflare.com](https://blog.cloudflare.com/post-quantum-visibility/)
- DigiCert: [www.digicert.com](https://www.digicert.com/news/quantum-security-deployment-remains-stuck)
- Help Net Security: [www.helpnetsecurity.com](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/21/axiad-pqc-migration-readiness-gaps-report/)
- HKMA: [www.hkma.gov.hk](https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2026/07/20260727-3/)
- npm Docs: [docs.npmjs.com](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-audit)

Not financial advice: do your own work.

Stocks mentioned: $IBM (NYSE), $IONQ (NYSE), $QNT (NASDAQ), $GOOGL (NASDAQ), $MSFT (NASDAQ), $INTC (NASDAQ), $PSQL (NASDAQ), $AAPL (NASDAQ), $NET (NYSE) and $FFIV (NASDAQ).

Shayne Heffernan, Ph.D., is the founder of the KnightsBridge Group ([shayneheffernan.com](https://www.shayneheffernan.com)).

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